Political campaigns involve, in the simplest case, two competing campaign groups which try to obtain a majority of votes. We propose a novel mathematical framework to study political campaign dynamics on social networks whose constituents are either political activists or persuadable individuals. Activists are convinced and do not change their opinion and they are able to move around in the social network to motivate persuadable individuals to vote according to their opinion.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the advancement of network science, it has become possible to incorporate the salient features of opinion formation and spreading into large-scale network models [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
The study of political mobilization is one example of such opinion dynamics, which allowed remarkable observations such as the identification of universal features in elections [8] , the importance of easily persuadable individuals for opinion cascades [9] , the impact of online social influence [10] and the necessity of social reinforcement in order to convince people [11] [12] [13] .
In recent years, political mobilization and the associated campaigns became more and more sophisticated due to online social media, the availability of data on personal preferences and the huge financial campaign support 1 [14, 15] . Still, the influence of campaign characteristics such as the number of political activists, political clout or the size of the campaign budget on actual outcomes is not well understood. A more profound understanding of political campaigns is necessary to appropriately interpret the corresponding outcomes and to possibly redesign certain aspects of campaign policies [16] . Thus, we propose a novel mathematical framework to describe political campaign dynamics on networks. More specifically, we account for the fact that mobile political activists can convince persuadable individuals under certain efficiency and cost restrictions. We demonstrate the existence of one unique stationary solution and rigorously describe the interplay between activists, political clout, budgets and campaign costs on this state, thereby understanding how candidates can win elections. We find that a given budget might allow different choices of the number of activists, such that campaign groups find themselves in an activist-choice game. In these strategic situations, a campaign group chooses activists as a best response to the choice of the other campaign group, which may be crucial for winning the election. Interestingly, some activist combinations lead to strong competition and thus to a large campaign budget.
Furthermore, an advantage in terms of political clout can overcome a substantial budget disadvantage or a lower number of activists. This is illustrated for the US presidential election of 2016, in which the winner had a huge budget disadvantage and a lower number of activists to support him.
Election campaigns are an essential component of democratic politics. They have been In this example, an A + activist node is going to occupy an empty node O to convince B 0 nodes.
The utility condition ρ A #B 0 − c A > 0 in this case is, for example, fulfilled for ρ A = 1 and c A = 2.
studied extensively by scholars across social sciences and political sciences, in particular, as surveyed recently in Ref. [17] . Three characteristics from this rich body of literature are particularly important for the construction of our model and its investigation:
1. Some voters are amenable to persuasion and opinion switching, i.e., they might be induced to vote for either candidate if approached by a corresponding campaign activist. In the US presidential election of 2016, the proportion of undecided voters was estimated to be around 20% to 25% [18] . The share of persuadable voters is also large for elections below presidential level, 2. The most effective tactics in campaigns are personal interactions between activists and persuadable voters, such as door-to-door interaction or phone calls [19] , 3. Money matters in campaigns. The benefit of campaign expenditures is positive, but typically low and subject to rapid decay [19] .
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We consider a network with N nodes. Each node is either occupied by an individual having an opinion A or B or it is in an unoccupied state O. The total number of nodes is We illustrate the campaign model in Fig. 1 . Activists have a fixed opinion and they are able to move from their current location to unoccupied nodes to convince persuadable individuals who do not change their location. Each campaign group is given a finite budget B A and B B respectively, and a certain cost c A and c B , respectively, has to be paid for every attempt at convincing a group of persuadable individuals. More specifically, an activist A + has the possibility to occupy an empty node O from any place in order to change with probability By definition of our model, we know that only a 0 and b 0 change over time. Thus,ȧ + = 0,
. It is now possible to derive mean-field rate equations ofȧ 0 (t) andḃ 0 (t) by assuming a perfectly mixed population in the thermodynamic limit. Mean-field approximations have been proven useful to gain important insights about a given spreading dynamics [21, 22] , and many real-world social networks are well described by mean-field approximations [23] . Our analytical results are supported by stochastic kinetic Monte Carlo simulations [24, 25] . For analytical tractability, we assume a regular network with fixed degree k, i.e. a fixed number of neighbors. A meanfield approach for general degree distributions f k is presented in Refs. [26, 27] and is based on an additional weighted sum accounting for different degrees in the network. We only focus on the derivation ofȧ 0 (t), since b
Our first observation is that the utility condition ρ A #B 0 − c A > 0 corresponds to a threshold [11, 12, [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] 
where Θ(·) denotes the Heaviside step function accounting for the fact that opinion changes only occur when enough budget is available and k j,l,m,n,r is the multinomial coefficient, such that j +l +m+n+r = k and S k−j = {l, m, n, r ≥ 0, l + m + n + r = k − j}. The prefactor o in Eq. (1) accounts for the necessity for a node to be empty before an activist can occupy it, and ρ A , ρ B denote the probabilities to persuade others, henceforth convincing probabilities. deductions from the respective budgets are described bẏ B are the campaign budgets of the two campaign groups, respectively. In general, our model could also be extended to more than two campaign groups, i.e. more than two candidates. It is then necessary to account for the additional corresponding costs, convincing probabilities and transition functions.
In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the dynamics captured by Eq. (1) exhibits a unique stationary solution for a given set of initial conditions. Furthermore, we show that there is a complex interplay between the fractions of activists, convincing probabilities and costs. In the case of ρ A = ρ B and c A = c B , the campaign group with the larger fraction of activists obtains the majority. Otherwise, different convincing probabilities and different costs lead to a shift of the stationary states. In particular, a large convincing probability and small cost is advantageous for the respective campaign group. Convincing probabilities cannot be interchanged with the fractions of activists. Small convincing probabilities and large costs lead to longer transients and to stationary states that are closer together, i.e., small gaps between the final campaign results. Unlike the activist fractions, convincing probabilities and costs also enter in the threshold condition. We also discuss one example in the Appendix, which illustrates how the influence of ρ and c might, surprisingly, lead to a change in the majority structure.
RESULTS

Budget limitations
A political campaign typically lasts a fixed time T . We assume that political campaigns have information about the convincing probabilities ρ A and ρ B as well as the costs c A and c B . A typical goal of each campaign is to convince as many people as possible by spending the available budget in such a way that there is no money left at time T when campaigns start at time 0. Intuitively, the amount of budget spent does not only depend on the costs and the convincing probabilities but also on the number of activists in each campaign group. In particular, the budget B B will be exhausted faster than budget B A if the initial budgets, the costs and the convincing probabilities are equal but the fraction of activists of campaign group B is larger than the one of group A. This might be problematic if the campaign lasts longer than the time until budget exhaustion, since campaign group B will lose its majority sooner or later. We illustrate this effect in Fig. 2 (left) where numerical simulations are presented together with the corresponding mean-field approximation. The finite size and the finite degree of the underlying random regular network lead to deviations from the mean-field perfect mixing assumption. For large degrees one finds better agreement between simulations and mean-field results [26] . Still, the simulated dynamics is qualitatively captured by Eq. (1). To better understand the influence of budget restrictions, we now focus on two relevant points related to the latter example: (i) we want to determine the minimum necessary budget for given fractions of activists a + , b + and a given campaign duration, and (ii) we want to discuss strategies when to send how many activists to effectively use a given budget so that it lasts until the campaign ends.
We begin with the discussion of point (i) and find that the minimum necessary budgets
according to Eqs. solve Eqs. (4) and (5) and find that the mean-field initial budgets are B min A (T ) = 8.4 and B min B (T ) = 9.1. We clearly see in Fig. 2 (right) that these budgets are sufficient. Due to the perfect mixing assumption, the mean-field dynamics tends to be slightly faster than the one of the simulations.
Strategic choices of activists
For the discussion of point (ii), it is important to realize that while Eqs. (4) and (5) yield unique minimal budgets for given a + , b + and T , finding the two fractions of activists, for
given campaign budgets and a duration T , is not a unique operation.
Here we solely focus on choosing constant fractions of activists a + , b + within the interval (0, 0.3], since a + and b + are typically not too large. Fig. 3 (left) helps to gain some intuition for the existence of multiple possible choices of a + and b + for given campaign budgets.
We assumed equal convincing probabilities and costs. In this case, the campaign group with the larger fraction of activists wins the campaign in the limit of long times, as shown in the Appendix. Next we look at the Nash equilibria of the strategic choices in the ensuing activist game as illustrated in Fig. 3 (left) . Formally, we investigate the best responses of the game defined
A Nash equilibrium is a constellation (a + , b + ) that solves both problems. In our example a larger fraction of activists increases the chance of winning and we obtain three best responses for a fixed b + ∈ {0.04, 0.2, 0.3}
As a consequence of the parameters and initial conditions used in Can clout compensate a lower budget and fewer activists?
The model outlined above can be used to study political campaigns for specific parameter environments and to address campaign regulation. As an example we illustrate an application of the model and illustrate a phenomenon observed in the recent presidential election in the US battleground states. Three characteristics are widely discussed. First, Donald
Trump had a significantly lower budget than Hillary Clinton 2 . More precisely, he had half of Clinton's budget (404 versus 807 million US dollars). Second, Clinton had a higher num- ber of volunteers than Trump (7% versus 4%) 3 . Third, Trump was able to flip millions of white Obama supporters to his side. We thus investigate whether an advantage in terms of clout could compensate both a significantly lower budget and a lower share of activists.
The clout is quantified through the convincing probabilities ρ A and ρ B . In Fig. 4 we illustrate a campaign situation roughly comparable to the one of the US presidential election 2016. We interpret campaign group A as the Clinton group, whereas group B represents This observation has broader implications for the resilience of democracy, as it is related to recent phenomena associated with populism. Candidates who promise to protect citizens from unemployment or income shocks caused by disruptions due to globalization or automation may be able to generate sufficient clout [34] . Such candidates may win election campaigns even if they will not be able to keep their promises or even enact detrimental policies.
Finally, we compare the simulation results presented in Fig. 4 (left) 
DISCUSSION
We have developed a novel framework to study political campaign dynamics on social networks based on three essential features: moving activists, political clout and campaign budgets. We illustrated how the complex interplay between these factors determines the success of a campaign group. Our results imply that the right initial choice of the number of activists might lead to an important advantage in winning a campaign. In addition, we also showed that typical campaign characteristics can be taken into account by our model allowing to apply it to the US presidential election of 2016. What is more, our model opens up many further applications. For instance, we could introduce caps on campaign budgets to study how such regulations impact the outcome of elections. Furthermore, our framework allows to integrate additional channels such as media or targeting [35] which strongly influence campaigns. Finally, by introducing preferences of citizens about policymaking once a candidate is in office, we can identify conditions under which a politician may win and enacts policies that will harm a majority of citizens. Fig. 6 (left) we show a typical time evolution of our dynamics. The corresponding phase portrait is illustrated in Fig. 6 (right) . We clearly see that there is only one stable fixed point for a 0 and b 0 .
To obtain some insights into the general behavior of the stationary solutions, we simplify We want to find out if the function has only one fixed point. Our first observation is that the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) defined as f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) approaches f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) = k eff λ for x → 0 and f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) = −k eff for x → 1. If the function f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) monotonically decreased in x in the interval (0, 1), there would be only a unique fixed point.
For m eff = 0, 1, the derivative with respect to x is given by f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) = −k eff (1 + λ) and for m eff = k eff the derivative is f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) = −k
In both cases, the derivative indicates a monotonically decreasing function and thus the existence of a unique fixed point.
For a general threshold m eff the derivative can be obtained using Mathematica [36] ,
Since x takes values in the interval (0, 1) and m eff ∈ {2, . . . , k eff − 1}, we only have to verify if the hypergeometric functions 2 F 1 are positive. Then f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) would be negative.
Due to the fact that m eff − k eff < 0, the hypergeometric function takes the form [36] ,
where (·) n denotes the Pochhammer symbol. The last term
is smaller than 0 and thus the terms of the sum are positive, since 2 F 1 1, m eff − k eff ; m eff + 1;
The same argument applies to 2 F 1 1, m eff − k eff ; m eff + 1;
. Therefore, f (x; m eff , k eff , λ) < 0 and the basic model as defined by Eq. (A.1) has one unique stationary state. We now focus on the more general case with two thresholds, i.e. m
. Thus, the resulting dynamics is described byẋ
Again, the right-hand side of Eq. (
The first sums in Eqs. 3. Further effects resulting from the influence of convincing probability and cost
In the previous Sec. 2, we have seen that not only the fractions of activists matter but that a change in convincing probability and cost also shifts the stationary states to the advantage or disadvantage of one campaign group. There are, however, other effects originating from the influence of convincing probability and costs that shall be discussed here. To properly analyze this influence and not to deal with too many parameters, we again set ρ = ρ A = ρ B and c = c A = c B .
We first want to discuss the influence of the parameter ρ on the saturation time number of persuadable nodes in order to perform an action, cf. Fig. 9 . We illustrate the dependence of a characteristic transient time-scale t c on ρ in Fig. 10 (left) . In agreement with the qualitative arguments given above, we find that t c decreases as ρ increases. Moreover, the inset in Fig. 10 (left) shows that the gap ∆ = |b 0 st − a 0 st | between the stationary states increases with ρ.
Similar to the effect of a small convincing probability ρ, a large cost parameter c would intuitively lead to longer transients as shown in Fig. 9 . Not all neighborhoods fulfill the utility condition in the case of a large cost and consequently it takes more time to reach the equilibrium. We also illustrate this behavior in Fig. 10 (right) . As the cost parameter c increases, the characteristic time-scale t c is getting larger. Moreover, we see in the inset case. In addition, we could think about a change of the majority structure as a consequence of the influence of ρ and c. We assume another compartment of inactive individuals with a fixed opinion a − and b − . They are not relevant for the dynamics at all but influence the majority structure. We now set a − = 0.1 and b − = 0.02, thereby implicitly reducing the value of o. As a consequence, 53 % of the individuals are in favor of opinion B in the first case but in the second case, this campaign group loses its majority with 49 %.
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